The Dark Side of Competition for Status

被引：277

作者：

Charness, Gary ^{[1
]}

Masclet, David ^{[2
,3
]}

Villeval, Marie Claire ^{[4
,5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA

[2] Univ Rennes, Ctr Res Econ & Management, Natl Ctr Sci Res, F-35000 Rennes, France

[3] Ctr Interuniv Res & Anal Org, Montreal, PQ H3A 2A5, Canada

[4] Univ Lyon, F-69007 Lyon, France

[5] Grp Econ Anal & Theory Lyon St Etienne, Natl Ctr Sci Res, F-69130 Ecully, France

[6] Inst Study Labor, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2014年 / 60卷 / 01期

关键词：

status; ranking; feedback; sabotage; doping; competitive preferences; experiment; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; TOURNAMENTS; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; PUNISHMENT; SABOTAGE; WORK; PAY;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one's performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by sabotaging others' work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducing sabotage opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, ranking incentives should be used with care. Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peers but increases in-group rivalry.

引用

页码：38 / 55

页数：18

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