Rents, competition, and corruption

被引：763

作者：

Ades, A

Di Tella, R

机构：

[1] Goldman Sachs & Co, New York, NY 10004 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Grad Sch Business Adm, Boston, MA 02163 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1999年 / 89卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.89.4.982

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

收藏

页码：982 / 993

页数：12

相关论文

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