Beyond Simple Utility: Incentive Design and Trade-Offs for Corporate Employee-Entrepreneurs

被引:94
作者
Monsen, Erik
Patzelt, Holger [1 ]
Saxton, Todd [2 ]
机构
[1] Max Planck Inst Econ, Growth & Publ Policy Grp, Jena, Germany
[2] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA
关键词
VENTURE CAPITALISTS; ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES; OPPORTUNITY COSTS; CONJOINT-ANALYSIS; AGENCY THEORY; DECISION; MANAGERS; FIRMS; RISK; COMPENSATION;
D O I
10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00314.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
To strengthen the theoretical foundations of incentive system design for corporate entrepreneurship, we develop a moderated model of new venture participation, integrating financial, risk, and effort factors to more comprehensively understand the limits of economic utility maximization theory. We make explicit the trade-offs and opportunity costs for corporate employee-entrepreneurs. We use a conjoint field experiment to collect data on 1952 decisions made by 61 corporate employees to test how risk and effort moderate an employee's decision to participate in a new corporate venture. We find that these factors do interact to affect the choice to engage in corporate entrepreneurship projects.
引用
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页码:105 / 130
页数:26
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