Motivational Crowding in Sustainable Development Interventions

被引:72
作者
Agrawal, Arun [1 ]
Chhatre, Ashwini [2 ]
Gerber, Elisabeth R. [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Michigan, Sch Nat Resources & Environm, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
[2] Indian Sch Business, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India
[3] Univ Michigan, Gerald R Ford Sch Publ Policy, Publ Policy, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES; CONSERVATION ATTITUDES; INTRINSIC MOTIVATION; DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; PROTECTED AREAS; PUBLIC-GOODS; INCENTIVES; INSTITUTIONS; PAYMENTS;
D O I
10.1017/S0003055415000209
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
We used a quasi-experimental research design to study the extent of motivational crowding in a recent sustainable development intervention in northern India. The project provided participants with both private and communal material benefits to enhance their incomes, and environmental and social information to inculcate pro-environmental motivations. We compared changes in reported motivations of participants for conserving forest resources, before and after project implementation, with changes in reported motivations of matched nonparticipants. We found that villagers who received private economic benefits were more likely to change from an environmental to an economic motivation for forest protection, whereas those who engaged in communal activities related to the project were less likely to change from an environmental to an economic motivation. These results, which indicate a substantial but conditional degree of motivational crowding, clarify the relationships between institutional change, incentives, and motivations and have important implications for the design of sustainable development interventions.
引用
收藏
页码:470 / 487
页数:18
相关论文
共 95 条
[11]  
[Anonymous], 1995, Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign
[12]  
[Anonymous], 39930 WORLD BANK
[13]  
[Anonymous], PERSONAL CAUSATION A
[14]   Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially [J].
Ariely, Dan ;
Bracha, Anat ;
Meier, Stephan .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2009, 99 (01) :544-555
[15]   Large Stakes and Big Mistakes [J].
Ariely, Dan ;
Gneezy, Uri ;
Loewenstein, George ;
Mazar, Nina .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2009, 76 (02) :451-469
[16]   Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation [J].
Bénabou, R ;
Tirole, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2003, 70 (03) :489-520
[17]   Incentives and prosocial behavior [J].
Benabou, Roland ;
Tirole, Jean .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (05) :1652-1678
[18]   IDENTITY, MORALS, AND TABOOS: BELIEFS AS ASSETS [J].
Benabou, Roland ;
Tirole, Jean .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2011, 126 (02) :805-855
[19]   Models of electoral system change [J].
Benoit, K .
ELECTORAL STUDIES, 2004, 23 (03) :363-389
[20]   More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust, and crowding [J].
Bohnet, I ;
Frey, BS ;
Huck, S .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 2001, 95 (01) :131-144