Policy watch - Developments in antitrust economics

被引:20
作者
Baker, JB [1 ]
机构
[1] Fed Trade Commiss, Bur Econ, Washington, DC 20580 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.13.1.181
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article highlights recent developments in antitrust economics that have influenced the way the federal antitrust enforcement agencies analyze five issues: efficiencies from mergers, entry conditions, practices facilitating coordination, exclusionary practices, and the unilateral competitive effects of mergers.
引用
收藏
页码:181 / 194
页数:14
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