Is targeted advertising always beneficial?

被引：65

作者：

Ben Elhadj-Ben Brahim, Nada ^{[1
,2
]}

Lahmandi-Ayed, Rim ^{[1
]}

Laussel, Didier ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Ecole Polytech Tunisie, LIM Grp MES, Tunis, Tunisia

[2] Univ Aix Marseille 2, GREQAM, Marseille, France

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2011年 / 29卷 / 06期

关键词：

Targeted and random advertising; Advertising cost; Spatial differentiation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.03.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their "natural markets", while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：678 / 689

页数：12

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