Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of environmental policy

被引:329
作者
Fredriksson, PG
Svensson, J
机构
[1] So Methodist Univ, Dept Econ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA
[2] Stockholm Univ, Inst Int Econ Studies, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
bribery; lobbying; uncertainty; environmental regulations;
D O I
10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00036-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation, taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence. The predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important. Political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low, but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high. Corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations, but the effect disappears as political instability increases. The empirical findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the model. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1383 / 1405
页数:23
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