The use of Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) in a mid-air collision to understand some characteristics of the air traffic management system resilience

被引:154
作者
Rodrigues de Carvalho, Paulo Victor [1 ]
机构
[1] Nucl Engn Inst, Natl Nucl Energy Commiss, BR-21945970 Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
关键词
Mid-air collision; System safety; Accident analysis; Air traffic management; Resilience engineering;
D O I
10.1016/j.ress.2011.05.009
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
The Functional Resonance Analysis Model (FRAM) defines a systemic framework to model complex systems for accident analysis purposes. We use FRAM in the mid-air collision between flight GLO1907, a commercial aircraft Boeing 737-800, and flight N600XL, an executive jet EMBRAER E-145, to investigate key resilience characteristics of the Air Traffic Management System (ATM). This ATM system related accident occurred at 16:56 Brazilian time on September 29, 2006 in the Amazonian sky. FRAM analysis of flight monitoring functions showed system constraints (equipment, training, time, and supervision) that produce variability in system behavior, creating demand resources mismatches in an attempt to perceive and control the developing situation. This variability also included control and coordination breakdowns and automation surprises (TCAS functioning). The analysis showed that under normal variability conditions (without catastrophic failures) the ATM system (pilots, controllers, supervisors, and equipment) was not able to close the control loops of the flight monitoring functions using feedback or feedforward strategies to achieve an adequate control of an aircraft flying in the controlled air space. Our findings shed some light on the resilience of Brazilian ATM system operation and indicated that there is a need of a deeper understanding on how the system is actually functioning. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1482 / 1498
页数:17
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