Equilibrium selection in bargaining models

被引：32

作者：

Binmore, K

Samuelson, L

Young, P

机构：

[1] Univ Wisconsin, Dept Econ, Madison, WI 53706 USA

[2] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1E 6BT, England

[3] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2003年 / 45卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Nash demand game; contract game; evolutionary dynamics; equilibrium selection; risk dominance; best response; stochastic stability;

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00146-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines evolutionary equilibrium selection in bargaining models. We show that random best-response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable. This allows us to characterize the implications of these dynamics in simple bargaining games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：296 / 328

页数：33

共 45 条

[21] OTHER SOLUTIONS TO NASHS BARGAINING PROBLEM [J].