On some variants of prisoner's dilemma dynamics

被引：8

作者：

Ahmed, E

Hegazi, AS

Elgazzar, AS

机构：

[1] UAE Univ, Fac Sci, Dept Math, Al Ain 17551, U Arab Emirates

[2] Univ Mansoura, Fac Sci, Dept Math, Mansoura 35516, Egypt

[3] Fac Educ, Dept Math, Al Arish, Egypt

来源：

APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION | 2005年 / 163卷 / 01期

关键词：

prisoner's dilemma game; Smale's game; imitation dynamics;

D O I：

10.1016/j.amc.2004.01.025

中图分类号：

O29 [应用数学];

学科分类号：

070104 ;

摘要：

In this work two variants of Prisoner's dilemma game are given. The first one is related to spite. Spite is the willingness to harm oneself in order to cause more harm to another. An extreme case is when one goes as far as killing himself to harm his enemy. This behavior sometimes occurs in humans. To model it, the standard replicator dynamics is replaced by imitation dynamics. We study the spite replicator dynamics for the prisoner's dilemma game and derive a case where cooperation may arise. The second variant is the prisoner's dilemma loner game. Smale's memory formulation for game is used to study it. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：163 / 168

页数：6

共 9 条

[1]

AHMED E, 2000, ADV COMPLEX SYST, V4, P423

[2]

[Anonymous], 1998, Evol. Games Popul. Dyn., DOI DOI 10.1017/CBO9781139173179

[3] Replicator dynamics for optional public good games [J].