Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis

被引：75

作者：

Aktas, Nihat ^{[1
]}

de Bodt, Eric ^{[2
]}

Roll, Richard ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] EMLYON Business Sch, F-69130 Ecully, France

[2] Univ Lille Nord France, European Ctr Corp Control Studies, F-59020 Lille, France

[3] UCLA Anderson, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2011年 / 17卷 / 01期

关键词：

Acquisition program; Learning; Hubris; Bid premium; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MARKET; FIRMS; EXCHANGE; AUCTIONS; MERGERS; TOEHOLDS; MANAGERS; BIAS; CEOS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.07.002

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Recent academic studies indicate that acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) decline from deal to deal in acquisition programs. Does this pattern suggest hubristic CEO behaviors are significant enough to influence average CAR patterns during acquisition programs? An alternative explanation is CEO learning. This study therefore tests for learning using successive acquisitions of large U.S. public targets undertaken by U.S. acquirers. A dynamic framework reveals that both rational and hubristic CEOs take on average investor reactions to their previous deals into account and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. These results are consistent with a learning hypothesis. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：18 / 32

页数：15

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