Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited

被引:15
作者
Arguedas, C [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Europea Madrid, Dept Econ, Madrid 28670, Spain
关键词
bargaining; environmental standards; non-compliance; environmental technologies;
D O I
10.1016/j.jeem.2004.11.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We explore the possibility that firms and regulators achieve cooperative agreements in environmental regulation. We show that it is possible that firms choose cleaner technologies in exchange for reductions of the fines for non-compliance with environmental standards. Interestingly, the likelihood of achieving these agreements depends negatively on the monitoring costs, positively on the external damages, and non-monotonically on the differences among the eligible technologies and the maximum sanctions for violating the standards. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:422 / 433
页数:12
相关论文
共 14 条
[1]   Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator [J].
Amacher, GS ;
Malik, AS .
JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT, 1996, 30 (02) :233-253
[2]   Controlling pollution with relaxed regulations [J].
Arguedas, C ;
Hamoudi, H .
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, 2004, 26 (01) :85-104
[3]  
BEBCHUK LA, 1991, 4 HARV LAW SCH
[4]   CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J].
BECKER, GS .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1968, 76 (02) :169-217
[5]  
ELLIS G, 1992, UNPUB OPTIMAL ENV RE
[6]   REGULATING EXTERNALITIES THROUGH TESTING [J].
GRIESON, RE ;
SINGH, N .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1990, 41 (03) :369-387
[7]   A RECONSIDERATION OF ENFORCEMENT LEVERAGE WHEN PENALTIES ARE RESTRICTED [J].
HARFORD, JD ;
HARRINGTON, W .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1991, 45 (03) :391-395
[8]   ENFORCEMENT LEVERAGE WHEN PENALTIES ARE RESTRICTED [J].
HARRINGTON, W .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1988, 37 (01) :29-53
[10]   Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment [J].
Heyes, AG .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1996, 60 (02) :251-265