The construction of the rule of law in Argentina - A tale of two provinces

被引:42
作者
Chavez, RB [1 ]
机构
[1] USN Acad, Annapolis, MD 21402 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/4150188
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Subnational comparison can help analyze how nascent democracies construct the rule of law. Variation in judicial autonomy across two neighboring Argentine provinces is a function of interparty competition. The rule of law results from a balance of power between at least two political parties, neither of which has monolithic control; no highly disciplined party sustains control of both the legislative and executive branches. Effective party competition and low party discipline create a climate in which an autonomous judiciary can develop. In contrast, monolithic party control, defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a disciplined party, blocks development of the rule of law.
引用
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页码:417 / +
页数:22
相关论文
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