Managing Distributors' Changing Motivations over the Course of a Joint Sales Program

被引:38
作者
Gu, Flora F. [1 ]
Kim, Namwoon [1 ]
Tse, David K. [2 ]
Wang, Danny T. [3 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Management & Mkt, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Hong Kong, Sch Business, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Dept Mkt, Sch Business, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
marketing channel; information asymmetry; program participation; risk-avoidance motivation; rent-seeking motivation; BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS; GOVERNANCE VALUE ANALYSIS; MARKETING RELATIONSHIPS; CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS; CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS; AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS; SELLER RELATIONSHIPS; DECISION-MAKING; LIFE-CYCLE; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1509/jmkg.74.5.32
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Ensuring joint program participation by distributors is essential to channel management. Although studies confirm that firms can promote distributor participation by attending to their participation motivations, the authors argue that distributors may change their motivations over the course of a joint program, driven by an increase of program-related information and how their peer distributors behave. Drawing insights from the information asymmetry literature, the authors postulate that distributors' ex ante commitment is driven by their motivation to avoid losses, and after they participate, their ex post adaptation reflects rent-seeking motivations. This study also examines how the participation of peer distributors operates as an information signal that moderates the motivation participation link for the focal distributor. In the context of an actual sales program, this study confirms the postulate of motivation shift and the salience of network-based information in distributors' program participation. The results show that a manufacturer needs to manage its distributors' participation in a discriminant, process-oriented, and system-sensitive manner by addressing the latter's diverse motivations, changing goals in the joint program, and influences from peer distributors.
引用
收藏
页码:32 / 47
页数:16
相关论文
共 75 条
[21]   The iron cage revisited - Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Reprinted from the American Sociological Association vol 48, pg 147-160, 1983) [J].
DiMaggio, PJ ;
Powell, WW .
ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, VOL 17, 2000: ECONOMICS MEETS SOCIOLOGY IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, 2000, 17 :143-166
[22]  
Eisenhardt KM, 2000, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V21, P1105, DOI 10.1002/1097-0266(200010/11)21:10/11<1105::AID-SMJ133>3.0.CO
[23]  
2-E
[24]   AGENCY THEORY - AN ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW [J].
EISENHARDT, KM .
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, 1989, 14 (01) :57-74
[25]   Patterns of credible commitments: Territory and brand selectivity in industrial distribution channels [J].
Fein, AJ ;
Anderson, E .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING, 1997, 61 (02) :19-34
[26]   Organizing and managing channels of distribution [J].
Frazier, GL .
JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMY OF MARKETING SCIENCE, 1999, 27 (02) :226-240
[27]  
Ganesan S., 1994, J MARKETING, V58, P1, DOI DOI 10.2307/1252265
[28]   Strategic fit in industrial alliances: An empirical test of governance value analysis [J].
Ghosh, M ;
John, G .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 2005, 42 (03) :346-357
[29]   Governance value analysis and marketing strategy [J].
Ghosh, M ;
John, G .
JOURNAL OF MARKETING, 1999, 63 :131-145
[30]   ECONOMIC-ACTION AND SOCIAL-STRUCTURE - THE PROBLEM OF EMBEDDEDNESS [J].
GRANOVETTER, M .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 1985, 91 (03) :481-510