Limits of economic and strategic rationality for agents and MA systems

Al adoption of the game-theoretic paradigm although motivated and productive, suffers from basic limits for modelling autonomous agents and MA systems. First, we briefly restate game-theory's role for DAI and MAS: the introduction of formal prototypical social situations ("games"); the use of formal and sound notions, a self-interested view of autonomous agents, etc. Then, a number of criticisms, that have an impact on modelling intelligent social/individual action, are examined: the economicist interpretation of rationality; its instrumentalist conception, which leaves implicit the ends of agents' choices; the consequent multiple equilibria allowed by the theory; the context-unboundedness of rationality. Some contributions for a more heterarchic, context-bounded, architecture of rational agent are given, and a goal-based strategy, as distinct from a strictly utilitarian principle of decision-making, is proposed. Troubles of game-theory with multi-agent systems and in particular with modelling "cooperation" are outlined. Finally, some limits inherent in the notion of "incentive engineering" are pointed out. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.