Corporate venture capital: The role of governance factors

被引：25

作者：

Anokhin, Sergey ^{[1
]}

Peck, Simon ^{[2
]}

Wincent, Joakim ^{[3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Kent State Univ, Kent, OH 44240 USA

[2] Case Western Reserve Univ, Weatherhead Sch Management, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

[3] Hanken Sch Econ, Helsinki, Finland

[4] Lulea Univ Technol, Lulea, Sweden

来源：

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH | 2016年 / 69卷 / 11期

关键词：

Corporate venture capital; CVC investments; Corporate governance; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; BOARD STRUCTURE; INNOVATION; DIRECTORS; COMPENSATION; FIRMS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.04.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Research on corporate venture capital (CVC) has consistently proven its importance for innovation and other strategic goals, yet information on the antecedents of CVC activity is scarce. This study provides theoretical arguments for the role of governance factors including board, CEO, and institutional ownership characteristics. Empirical evidence from an international sample of global CVC investments shows that factors such as having a board with multiple board mandates and institutional ownership are important factors for CVC activity. The conclusion is that the role of governance factors is important, and that subsequent research should not ignore this group of factors. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：4744 / 4749

页数：6

共 25 条

[1] Outside directors and CEO selection [J].

Borokhovich, KA ;

Parrino, R ;

Trapani, T .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1996, 31 (03) :337-355

[2]

Chesbrough H., 2013, Open business models: How to thrive in the new innovation landscape

[3]

Dalton DR, 1998, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V19, P269, DOI 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(199803)19:3<269::AID-SMJ950>3.0.CO

[4]

2-K

[5] EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES AND THE HORIZON PROBLEM - AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION [J].

DECHOW, PM ;

SLOAN, RG .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1991, 14 (01) :51-89

[6] When do incumbents learn from entrepreneurial ventures? Corporate venture capital and investing firm innovation rates [J].

Dushnitsky, G ;

Lenox, MJ .

RESEARCH POLICY, 2005, 34 (05) :615-639

[7] TOP-MANAGEMENT-TEAM TENURE AND ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES - THE MODERATING ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION [J].

FINKELSTEIN, S ;

HAMBRICK, DC .

ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1990, 35 (03) :484-503

[8]

Fredriksen O., 2001, Journal of Enterprising Culture, V9, P201, DOI [10.1142/S0218495801000110, DOI 10.1142/S0218495801000110]

[9]

Freese B, 2007, ELGAR ORIG REF, P111

[10] Ownership structure, investment behaviour and firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries [J].

Gedajlovic, E ;

Yoshikawa, T ;

Hashimoto, M .

ORGANIZATION STUDIES, 2005, 26 (01) :7-35

← 1 2 3 →