Unanimous opinions in social influence networks

被引:7
作者
Kobayashi, J [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Dept Sociol, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
unanimous opinions; social influence; social networks; opinion formation; consensus; utilitarian; maximin;
D O I
10.1080/0022250X.2001.9990255
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
In this paper, I show that persons reach unanimous opinions even when they have different initial opinions and different social influences in social influence networks. Friedkin and Johnsen introduced a model of social influence networks, and identified conditions for initially diverse opinions to converge. However, they did not examine conditions of "unanimous" convergence. Hence, I provide sufficient conditions of such unanimous consensus by focusing on three typical but conflicting social influences: the equal influence, the influence of the lowest opinion, and no influence. I show that unanimous opinions occur even when persons have antagonistic social influences such as the equal influence and the influence of the lowest opinion. I also demonstrate that the most cooperative type is the equal influence, but the most central type is the no influence.
引用
收藏
页码:285 / 297
页数:13
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