Rent seeking in groups

被引：43

作者：

Ahn, T. K. ^{[2
]}

Isaac, R. Mark ^{[1
]}

Salmon, Timothy C. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA

[2] Korea Univ, Dept Publ Adm, Seoul 136701, South Korea

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2011年 / 29卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Rent seeking; Economic experiments;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.01.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Rent-seeking contests between groups involve conflicts of interests at the levels of individuals, groups, and the society as a whole. We conduct a series of economic experiments to study the behavior of groups and individuals competing against each other in rent-seeking contests. We find substantial over-contribution to rent-seeking relative to the equilibrium predictions of standard models regardless whether individuals compete against other individuals, groups compete against other groups, or individuals compete against groups. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：116 / 125

页数：10

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