COMPETITIVE-SHARE GROUP FORMATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTEST

被引：19

作者：

BAIK, KH

SHOGREN, JF

机构：

[1] YALE UNIV,SCH FORESTRY & ENVIRONM STUDIES,NEW HAVEN,CT 06511

[2] IOWA STATE UNIV SCI & TECHNOL,DEPT ECON,AMES,IA 50011

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1995年 / 83卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01047687

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine the possibility of forming a competitive-share group in rent-seeking contests. The competitive-share group has the following characteristics: (a) the group is treated as a single player competing with the nonmembers to win the rent, (b) the members choose their outlays noncooperatively, and (c) the members compete to take larger shares of the rent. We show that the competitive-share group is always formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is less relative to individual rent seeking - in other words, the social cost associated with rent seeking is less.

引用

页码：113 / 126

页数：14

共 22 条

[1] SEEKING RENTS BY SETTING RENTS - THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF RENT SEEKING [J].