CONFLICT AND RENT-SEEKING SUCCESS FUNCTIONS - RATIO VS DIFFERENCE MODELS OF RELATIVE SUCCESS

被引：387

作者：

HIRSHLEIFER, J

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00153394

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：101 / 112

页数：12

共 16 条

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