Do Nonfinancial Stakeholders Affect the Pricing of Risky Debt? Evidence from Unionized Workers

被引:117
作者
Chen, Huafeng [1 ]
Kacperczyk, Marcin [2 ]
Ortiz-Molina, Hernan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V5Z 1M9, Canada
[2] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
关键词
G32; G34; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; FINANCIAL RATIOS; MARKET VALUE; LABOR; WEALTH; COST; PROFITABILITY;
D O I
10.1093/rof/rfq028
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder-unionized workers-on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms' takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders' wealth.
引用
收藏
页码:347 / 383
页数:37
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