Hide and seek in Arizona

被引：16

作者：

Rosenthal, RW

Shachat, J

Walker, M

机构：

[1] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA

[2] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Econ, Singapore 117570, Singapore

[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

[4] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

[5] Univ Siena, Dept Polit Econ, I-53100 Siena, Italy

[6] Univ Calif San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093 USA

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2003年 / 32卷 / 02期

关键词：

mixed strategy; minimax; experiment;

D O I：

10.1007/s001820300159

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of "hide and seek". Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

引用

页码：273 / 293

页数：21

共 24 条

[1] Rent seeking with bounded rationality: An analysis of the all-pay auction [J].