Large Shareholder Diversification and Corporate Risk-Taking

被引:660
作者
Faccio, Mara [2 ]
Marchica, Maria-Teresa [1 ]
Mura, Roberto [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Manchester Business Sch, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
G11; G15; G31; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; BUSINESS GROUPS; OWNERSHIP; INVESTMENT; GOVERNANCE; PRIVATE; FINANCE; WEALTH; FAMILY; FIRM;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhr065
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using new data for the universe of firms covered in Amadeus, we reconstruct the portfolios of shareholders who hold equity stakes in private- and publicly traded European firms. We find great heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio diversification across large shareholders. Exploiting this heterogeneity, we document that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders undertake riskier investments than firms controlled by nondiversified large shareholders. The impact of large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking is both economically and statistically significant. Our results have important implications at the policy level because they identify one channel through which policy changes can improve economic welfare.
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页码:3601 / 3641
页数:41
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