Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance

被引：13

作者：

Arguedas, Carmen ^{[1
]}

Camacho, Eva ^{[2
]}

Luis Zofio, Jose ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Autonoma Madrid, E-28049 Madrid, Spain

[2] Univ Jaume 1, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain

来源：

ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS | 2010年 / 47卷 / 02期

关键词：

Environmental policy; Monitoring; Non-compliance; Technology adoption; ADVANCED ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY; EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS; POLLUTION-CONTROL; INNOVATION; FIRMS; ENFORCEMENT; TAXES; EFFICIENCY; STANDARDS; CHOICE;

D O I：

10.1007/s10640-010-9375-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms' incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.

引用

页码：261 / 274

页数：14

共 28 条

[1] To comply or not to comply? Pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning [J].