Investment implications of information acquisition and leakage

被引：12

作者：

Dye, RA ^{[1
]}

Sridhar, SS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 2003年 / 49卷 / 06期

关键词：

information acquisition; proprietary costs; moral hazard;

D O I：

10.1287/mnsc.49.6.767.16029

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

This paper studies when a firm will acquire additional information about a potential new project by consulting outsiders, when doing so runs the risk of reducing the value of implementing the project as a consequence of information leakage. The analysis evaluates the firm's information acquisition activities in both the presence and absence of moral hazard in project production.

引用

页码：767 / 783

页数：17