On the superiority of the multiple round ascending bid auction

被引：4

作者：

Branco, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, FCEE, P-1649023 Lisbon, Portugal

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2001年 / 70卷 / 02期

关键词：

FCC auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00340-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I compare the equilibria of standard auctions for two objects when there are unit and bundle bidders. In the example considered, the multiple round ascending bid auction performs better than the other mechanisms in both revenue and efficiency. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：187 / 194

页数：8