Corporate governance when founders are directors

被引：111

作者：

Li, Feng ^{[1
]}

Srinivasan, Suraj ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Stephen M Ross Sch Business, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] Harvard Univ, Sch Business, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 102卷 / 02期

关键词：

CEO compensation; CEO turnover; Founder; Boards of Directors; Corporate governance; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; FOUNDING-FAMILY OWNERSHIP; CEO TURNOVER; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; TRADE-OFF; COMPENSATION; FIRMS; MARKET; SUCCESSION; REPUTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.11.006

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：454 / 469

页数：16

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