Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to Nash equilibrium

被引：189

作者：

Hart, S

Mas-Colell, A

机构：

[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Math, Ctr Rat & Interact Decis Theory, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel

[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Econ, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel

[3] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona 08005, Spain

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2003年 / 93卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/000282803322655581

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：1830 / 1836

页数：7

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