Bidding for Labor

被引：94

作者：

Julien, Benoit ^{[1
,2
]}

Kennes, John ^{[3
]}

King, Ian ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Victoria Univ Wellington, Sch Econ & Finance, Wellington, New Zealand

[2] Victoria Univ Wellington, Inst Study Competit & Regulat, Wellington, New Zealand

[3] Pace Univ, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10038 USA

[4] Univ Victoria, Dept Econ, Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2, Canada

[5] Univ Auckland, Dept Econ, Auckland, New Zealand

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | 2000年 / 3卷 / 04期

关键词：

matching; wage dispersion; auctions; unemployment; efficiency;

D O I：

10.1006/redy.1999.0089

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction mechanism also generates equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers and constrained-efficient entry of vacancies in large economies. In a dynamic version of the model, we generate implied numerical values for equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. The theory makes the novel prediction that wage dispersion is a decreasing function of the discount factor and labor market tightness. (C) 2000 Academic Press

引用

页码：619 / 649

页数：31

共 30 条

[1]

[Anonymous], EC INFORM UNCERTAINT

[2]

BERNHARDT D, 1993, AM ECON REV, V83, P771

[3]

BLANCHARD OJ, 1989, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P1

[4]

Burdett K., 1997, PRICING FRICTI UNPUB