Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

被引:87
作者
Affinito, Massimiliano [1 ]
Tagliaferri, Edoardo [1 ]
机构
[1] Bank Italy, I-00184 Rome, Italy
关键词
Originate-to-distribute (O&D); Loan; Securitization; CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS; RISK-MANAGEMENT; CREDIT DERIVATIVES; SALES; BEHAVIOR; INVESTMENT; IMPACT; POLICY; ACCORD; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfs.2010.01.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates the exante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:189 / 202
页数:14
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