Exclusion of patients from pay-for-performance targets by english physicians

被引:118
作者
Doran, Tim [1 ]
Fullwood, Catherine [1 ]
Reeves, David [1 ]
Gravelle, Hugh [2 ]
Roland, Martin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Manchester, Natl Primary Care Res & Dev Ctr, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
[2] Univ York, Natl Primary Care Res & Dev Ctr, Ctr Hlth Econ, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
关键词
D O I
10.1056/NEJMsa0800310
中图分类号
R5 [内科学];
学科分类号
1002 ; 100201 ;
摘要
Background: In the English pay-for-performance program, physicians use a range of criteria to exclude individual patients from the quality calculations that determine their pay. This process, which is called exception reporting, is intended to safeguard patients against inappropriate treatment by physicians seeking to maximize their income. However, exception reporting may allow physicians to inappropriately exclude patients for whom targets have been missed (a practice known as gaming). Methods: We analyzed data extracted automatically from clinical computing systems for 8105 family practices in England (96% of all practices), data from the U.K. Census, and data on practice characteristics from the U.K. Department of Health. We determined the rate of exception reporting for 65 clinical activities and the association between this rate and the characteristics of patients and medical practices. Results: From April 2005 through March 2006, physicians excluded a median of 5.3% of patients (interquartile range, 4.0 to 6.9) from the quality calculations. Physicians were most likely to exclude patients from indicators that were related to providing treatments and achieving target levels of intermediate outcomes; they were least likely to exclude patients from indicators that were related to routine checks and measurements and to offers of treatment. The characteristics of patients and practices explained only 2.7% of the variance in exception reporting. We estimate that exception reporting accounted for approximately 1.5% of the cost of the pay-for-performance program. Conclusions: Exception reporting brings substantial benefits to pay-for-performance programs, providing that the process is used appropriately. In England, rates of exception reporting have generally been low, with little evidence of widespread gaming.
引用
收藏
页码:274 / 284
页数:11
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
Brook R H, 1986, Int J Technol Assess Health Care, V2, P53
[2]   General internists' views on pay-for-performance and public reporting of quality scores: A national survey [J].
Casalino, Lawrence P. ;
Alexander, G. Caleb ;
Jin, Lei ;
Konetzka, R. Tamara .
HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2007, 26 (02) :492-499
[3]   Will pay-for-performance and quality reporting affect health care disparities? [J].
Casalino, Lawrence P. ;
Elster, Arthur .
HEALTH AFFAIRS, 2007, 26 (03) :W405-W414
[4]  
*CTR MED MED SERV, PHYS QUAL REP IN PQR
[5]  
Custers T, 2007, HEALTH POLICY, V82, P226, DOI 10.1016/j.healthpol.2006.09.005
[6]   Pay-for-performance programs in family practices in the United Kingdom [J].
Doran, Tim ;
Fullwood, Catherine ;
Gravelle, Hugh ;
Reeves, David ;
Kontopantelis, Evangelos ;
Hiroeh, Urara ;
Roland, Martin .
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 2006, 355 (04) :375-384
[7]   Pay for performance at the tipping point [J].
Epstein, Arnold M. .
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 2007, 356 (05) :515-517
[8]   Paying for performance in the United States and abroad [J].
Epstein, Arnold M. .
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 2006, 355 (04) :406-408
[9]   Paying for performance - Risks and recommendations [J].
Fisher, Elliott S. .
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 2006, 355 (18) :1845-1847
[10]   Inducing or restraining demand: the market for night visits in primary care [J].
Giuffrida, A ;
Gravelle, H .
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 2001, 20 (05) :755-779