Bargaining framework for competitive green supply chains under governmental financial intervention

被引：234

作者：

Sheu, Jiuh-Biing ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Chiao Tung Univ, Inst Traff & Transportat, Taipei 10012, Taiwan

来源：

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2011年 / 47卷 / 05期

关键词：

Green supply chain cooperation; Bilateral negotiation; Nash bargaining game; Government's financial instruments; NETWORK EQUILIBRIUM; MANAGEMENT; MODEL; RENEGOTIATION; COORDINATION; FLEXIBILITY; INVESTMENT; CONTRACTS; DISPOSAL; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1016/j.tre.2010.12.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This work investigates the problem of negotiations between producers and reverse-logistics (RL) suppliers for cooperative agreements under government intervention. Utilizing the asymmetrical Nash bargaining game with uncertainties, this work seeks equilibrium negotiation solutions to player agendas. Analytical results indicate that financial intervention by a government generates a significant effect on the relative bargaining power of green supply chain members in negotiations. Over intervention by a government may result in adverse effects on chain members' profits and social welfare. Furthermore, a bargaining framework underlying the duopoly-oligopoly context may contribute to a negotiation outcome most profitable for green supply chain members. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：573 / 592

页数：20

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