State dependent pricing with a queue

被引：29

作者：

Chen, H ^{[1
]}

Frank, MZ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ British Columbia, Fac Commerce & Business Adm, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada

来源：

IIE TRANSACTIONS | 2001年 / 33卷 / 10期

基金：

加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1023/A:1010922621701

中图分类号：

T [工业技术];

学科分类号：

08 ;

摘要：

Existing studies of pricing when customers queue, assume that the firm cannot adjust the price to the state of demand. In most applications this assumption is false. We adapt the classic model of Naor (1969) to allow the firm to adjust the price to the state of demand. When customers are homogeneous the firm's pricing rule maximizes social welfare. When customers are unobservably heterogenous, the firm's pricing rule does not maximize social welfare. We find that the firm may not always attract customers even when it is technically and economically feasible to do so. This is interpreted as an option effect. The effects of changes to the basic parameters, on the queue length are presented.

引用

页码：847 / 860

页数：14