Separation of powers and development

被引：40

作者：

Laffont, JJ

Meleu, M

机构：

[1] Univ Toulouse 1, ARQADE, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[2] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[3] Univ Cocody, CREMIDE, Abidjan, Cote Ivoire

来源：

JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | 2001年 / 64卷 / 01期

关键词：

corruption; incentives; development; separation of powers;

D O I：

10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00127-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption, more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion-proofness. Then, we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries. Unfortunately, the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this "institution". (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D7; H5; O12.

引用

页码：129 / 145

页数：17

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[1] REGULATION BY DUOPOLY [J].