FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS

被引：413

作者：

CREMER, J ^{[1
]}

MCLEAN, RP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] RUTGERS STATE UNIV,DEPT ECON,NEW BRUNSWICK,NJ 08903

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1988年 / 56卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913096

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1247 / 1257

页数：11

共 10 条

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