OPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGIES UNDER UNCERTAINTY FOR A DISCRIMINATING MONOPOLIST WHEN DEMANDS ARE INTERDEPENDENT

被引：266

作者：

CREMER, J ^{[1
]}

MCLEAN, RP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911240

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：345 / 361

页数：17

共 22 条

[1] BAYESIAN INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE BELIEFS
DASPREMONT, C
GERARDVARET, LA
[J]. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 1982, 10 (01) : 83 - 103
[2] AUCTIONS AND BIDDING MODELS - A SURVEY
ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1980, 26 (02) : 119 - 142
[3] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
HARRIS, M
TOWNSEND, RM
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64
[4] ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS
HARRIS, M
RAVIV, A
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (06) : 1477 - 1499
[5] HARRIS M, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P347
[6] GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION PLAYED BY BAYESIAN PLAYERS .2. BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM POINTS
HARSANYI, JC
[J]. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1968, 14 (05) : 320 - 334
[7] Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[8] Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]
[9] HOLMSTROM B, 1981, 495 NW U JL KELL GRA
[10] COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR CONTRACTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE AUCTION PROCEDURES
HOLT, CA
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1980, 88 (03) : 433 - 445