Supply chain analysis under green sensitive consumer demand and cost sharing contract

被引:656
作者
Ghosh, Debabrata [1 ]
Shah, Janat [2 ]
机构
[1] Indian Inst Management, Kolkata 700104, W Bengal, India
[2] Indian Inst Management Udaipur, Udaipur 313001, Rajasthan, India
关键词
Green supply chains; Cost sharing contract; Channel coordination; Game theory; ENVIRONMENTAL-MANAGEMENT; CHANNEL COORDINATION; PRICE-COMPETITION; MECHANISMS; POLICIES; QUALITY; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.11.005
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
In this paper, we explore supply chain coordination issues arising out of green supply chain initiatives and explore the impact of cost sharing contract on the key decisions of supply chain players undertaking green initiatives. Our motivation comes from firms conducting pioneering work in the area of carbon footprint reduction in their supply chains through product redesign. Through a game theoretic approach we show how product greening levels, prices and profits are influenced by cost sharing contract within the supply chains. We study two models of cost sharing - one in which the retailer offers a cost sharing contract and the other in which the retailer and manufacturer bargain on the cost sharing contract. We also study the impact of greening costs and consumer sensitivity towards green products. Our key contribution lies in modelling cost sharing contract and analysing its impact on a green supply chain. Our study contributes to the burgeoning field of green supply chains and collaboration between channel partners. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:319 / 329
页数:11
相关论文
共 45 条
[21]   Managing channel profits [J].
Jeuland, Abel P. ;
Shugan, Steven M. .
MARKETING SCIENCE, 2008, 27 (01) :52-69
[22]   The impact of environmental management on firm performance [J].
Klassen, RD ;
McLaughlin, CP .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1996, 42 (08) :1199-1214
[23]   A COOPERATIVE GAME-THEORY MODEL OF QUANTITY DISCOUNTS [J].
KOHLI, R ;
PARK, H .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1989, 35 (06) :693-707
[24]   Cradle to cradle: Reverse logistics strategies and opportunities across three industry sectors [J].
Kumar, Sameer ;
Putnam, Valora .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2008, 115 (02) :305-315
[25]   Vertical strategic interaction: Implications for channel pricing strategy [J].
Lee, E ;
Staelin, R .
MARKETING SCIENCE, 1997, 16 (03) :185-207
[26]   An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration [J].
McGuire, Timothy W. ;
Staelin, Richard .
MARKETING SCIENCE, 2008, 27 (01) :115-130
[27]   Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government subsidies [J].
Mitra, Supriya ;
Webster, Scott .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS, 2008, 111 (02) :287-298
[28]   Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions [J].
Nagarajan, Mahesh ;
Sosic, Greys .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2008, 187 (03) :719-745
[29]   TWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES [J].
Nash, John .
ECONOMETRICA, 1953, 21 (01) :128-140
[30]   THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J].
Nash, John F., Jr. .
ECONOMETRICA, 1950, 18 (02) :155-162