Dynamical systems and the arising of cooperation in a Cournot duopoly

被引:16
作者
Cafagna, V
Coccorese, P
机构
[1] Univ Salerno, Dept Math & Comp Sci, I-84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy
[2] Univ Salerno, Dept Econ & Stat, I-84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy
[3] Univ Salerno, CELPE, I-84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy
关键词
D O I
10.1016/j.chaos.2004.11.051
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
Using the approach first introduced by Smale, we study a duopolistic market where agents have bounded memory and rationality. A stable cooperative equilibrium is achieved by employing a dynamical system that takes into account repeated interactions between firms and a set of behavioural rules. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:655 / 664
页数:10
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