Are better governed funds better monitors?

被引:23
作者
Chou, Julia [1 ]
Ng, Lilian [2 ]
Wang, Qinghai [3 ]
机构
[1] Florida Int Univ, Coll Business Adm, Miami, FL 33199 USA
[2] Univ Wisconsin, Sheldon B Lubar Sch Business, Milwaukee, WI 53201 USA
[3] Georgia Inst Technol, Coll Management, Atlanta, GA 30308 USA
关键词
Proxy voting; Corporate governance; Mutual funds; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; BOARD STRUCTURE; EQUITY PRICES; MUTUAL FUNDS; PERFORMANCE; INDUSTRY; MECHANISMS; DIRECTORS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.008
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using Morningstar mutual fund stewardship grade data, we find that the governance mechanisms of mutual funds play a key role in their monitoring of portfolio firms and in their investment decisions. Mutual funds with better governance practices tend to vote responsibly on corporate governance proposals of their portfolio firms and also provide better return performance. Furthermore, these funds tend to avoid investing in poorly governed firms. The results suggest that funds with quality governance are more likely to act in the interest of their investors, and that costs associated with funds' monitoring of their portfolio firms do not adversely affect their return performance. Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1254 / 1271
页数:18
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