Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments

被引:32
作者
Peris, JE [1 ]
Subiza, B [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Alicante, Dpet Fundamentos Anal Econ, E-03080 Alicante, Spain
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s003550050141
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Tournaments are complete and asymmetric binary relations. This type of binary relation rules out the possibility of ties or indifferences which are quite common in other contexts, in this work we generalize, from a normative point of view, some important tournament solutions to the context in which ties are possible.
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页码:217 / 231
页数:15
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