Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles

被引:23
作者
Duggan, J
LeBreton, M
机构
[1] UNIV AIX MARSEILLE 2,MARSEILLE,FRANCE
[2] INST UNIV FRANCE,F-13290 LES MILLES,FRANCE
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1996.0085
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the weak saddle, a solution due to Shapley, for a class of zero-sum games including tournament games, as defined by Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton. We then show that the minimal covering set of a tournament, proposed by Dutta, coincides with the weak saddle of the corresponding tournament game. This provides a positive foundation for the minimal covering set and yields, as corollaries, Dutta's existence and uniqueness theorems for the minimal covering set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:257 / 265
页数:9
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