Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European community

The supranational institutions of the European Community (EC)-the EC Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament-play a central role in EC governance, yet scholars remain divided on the question of supranational autonomy and influence, with neofunctionalists asserting, and intergovernmentalist denying, an independent causal role for these institutions. The new institutionalism using rational choice theory may overcome this theoretical stalemate by examining the functions that member state principals delegate to supranational agents, the autonomy of agents in carrying out their functions, and agents' ability to set the agenda for the member governments. The autonomy and influence of supranational institutions are a function of four factors: the distribution of preferences among member state principals and their supranational agents, the institutional rules governing EC policymaking, the information available to member governments and supranational agents, and the ability of supranational institutions to build transnational constituencies within the member states.