The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: Implications for CEO compensation

被引：128

作者：

Geletkanycz, MA

Boyd, BK

Finkelstein, S

机构：

[1] Boston Coll, Wallace E Carroll Sch Management, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA

[2] Arizona State Univ, Coll Business, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA

[3] Dartmouth Coll, Amos Tuck Sch Business Adm, Hanover, NH 03755 USA

来源：

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL | 2001年 / 22卷 / 09期

关键词：

CEO compensation; executive networks; social capital; strategic leadership;

D O I：

10.1002/smj.172

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

引用

页码：889 / 898

页数：10

共 51 条

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