Outsourcing structures and information flow in a three-tier supply chain

被引:61
作者
Guo, Pengfei [3 ]
Song, Jing-Sheng [2 ]
Wang, Yulan [1 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Inst Text & Clothing, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Logist & Maritime Studies, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Outsourcing; Turnkey; Consignment; Information asymmetry; CONTRACTS; POLICY; RISK;
D O I
10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.06.017
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
We consider a three-tier supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), a contract manufacturer (CM) and a supplier. We analyze and compare three outsourcing structures that are currently implemented by top-tier OEMs: (1) inhouse consignment, under which the OEM signs independent contracts with the CM and the supplier; (2) turnkey with integration, under which the OEM contracts with an alliance of the CM and the supplier; and (3) turnkey, under which the OEM contracts with the CM, and the CM then subcontracts with the supplier. The OEM is a Stackelberg leader who decides how much of the end product to produce. All parties use take-it-or-leave-it wholesale-price contracts. Both the CM and the supplier have private information about their own production costs. The OEM has prior information about these costs, but this prior information depends on the specific outsourcing structure. Each party's optimal decision is characterized. We then compare each party's profits across the three outsourcing structures and identify which benefits and when. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 187
页数:13
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