Partial acquisitions, the acquisition probability hypothesis, and the abnormal returns to partial targets

被引:18
作者
Akhigbe, Aigbe
Martin, Anna D. [1 ]
Whyte, Ann Marie
机构
[1] St Johns Univ, Peter J Tobin Coll Business, Dept Econ & Finance, Queens, NY 11439 USA
[2] Univ Akron, Coll Business Adm, Dept Finance, Akron, OH 44325 USA
[3] Univ Cent Florida, Coll Business Adm, Dept Finance, Orlando, FL 32816 USA
关键词
partial acquisition; acquisition probability; takeover; toehold; abnormal returns;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.11.015
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The acquisition of a partial stake in a target firm has been positively linked to the likelihood that the target will be involved in a follow on full acquisition involving either the original bidder or a third party bidder. Existing studies provide only suggestive evidence of this linkage by comparing the abnormal returns to partial targets that are ultimately acquired to those that are not. Using a sample of partial acquisitions, we identify characteristics that impact the probability of a full acquisition and provide a tangible link between partial target gains and the ex ante probability of acquisition. Partial targets experience positive announcement effects, and the gains are greater for subsequently acquired targets. Partial bids initiated by corporate bidders are more likely to result in a full acquisition, and the size of the acquired stake and the level of institutional ownership are positively linked to the probability of acquisition. Further, the partial target gains are positively linked to the ex ante probability of acquisition even after controlling for any increased monitoring and discipline that the partial bidder is expected to impose. The findings are robust across various time horizons and model specifications. (C) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:3080 / 3101
页数:22
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