Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings

被引：7

作者：

Hehenkamp, B ^{[1
]}

Qin, CZ

Stuart, C

机构：

[1] Univ Dortmund, Dept Econ, D-44221 Dortmund, Germany

[2] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS | 1999年 / 9卷 / 02期

关键词：

oligopoly; Bertrand equilibrium; Cournot equilibrium; natural selection; evolutionary games;

D O I：

10.1007/s001910050081

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition of the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar classical Cournot equilibrium.

引用

页码：211 / 224

页数：14

共 20 条

[11] EVOLUTIONARY SELECTION DYNAMICS IN GAMES - CONVERGENCE AND LIMIT PROPERTIES [J].