The evolution of norms

被引：209

作者：

Bendor, J

Swistak, P

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[2] Univ Maryland, Dept Govt & Polit, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

[3] Univ Maryland, Dept Math, Program Appl & Computat Math, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY | 2001年 / 106卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/321298

中图分类号：

C91 [社会学];

学科分类号：

030301 ; 1204 ;

摘要：

Social norms that induce us to reward or punish people not for what they did to us but for what they did to other members of one's group have long been thought as sine qua non sociological and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. This article shows how social norms can be deductively derived from principles of (boundedly) rational choice as mechanisms that are necessary to stabilize behaviors in a large class of evolutionary games.

引用

页码：1493 / 1545

页数：53

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