The emergence and persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German financial systems

被引:13
作者
Baliga, S
Polak, B
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Yale Univ, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhg020
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when these financial systems evolved during the British and German industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consider an entry model where financiers take the industrial structure as given when they lend and firms take the financial system as given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist, compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustness to coordination between lenders and borrowers.
引用
收藏
页码:129 / 163
页数:35
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