Environmental Regulation: An Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment

被引：58

作者：

Dijkstra, Bouwe R. ^{[1
,2
]}

Mathew, Anuj Joshua ^{[3
,4
]}

Mukherjee, Arijit ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Nottingham, GEP, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

[2] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, CESifo Munich, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

[3] Univ Navarra, Sch Econ, E-31080 Pamplona, Spain

[4] Univ Navarra, NCID, E-31080 Pamplona, Spain

来源：

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2011年 / 19卷 / 03期

关键词：

RAISING RIVALS COSTS; PLANT LOCATION; STRATEGIC USE; POLLUTION; FDI;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00966.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Empirical evidence has so far failed to confirm that lenient environmental regulation attracts investment from polluting firms. In a Cournot duopoly with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, we show that the foreign firm may want to relocate to the domestic country with stricter environmental regulation, when the move raises its rival domestic firm's cost by sufficiently more than its own. The domestic (foreign) country's welfare is (usually) lower with foreign direct investment.

引用

页码：568 / 578

页数：11