Valuing publicly sponsored research projects: Risks, scenario adjustments, and inattention

被引:23
作者
Burghart, Daniel R.
Cameron, Trudy Ann
Gerdes, Geoffrey R.
机构
[1] Univ Oregon, Dept Econ, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
[2] Fed Reserve Board Governors, Washington, DC USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
failure risk; redundancy risk; scenario adjustment; inattention; stated preferences; willingness to pay; R&D benefits;
D O I
10.1007/s11166-007-9018-5
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Survey-based choice scenarios used to value non-market public goods typically preclude any risk that the benefits described may not be delivered. Our survey specifies explicit risks of (a) outright program failure and (b) program redundancy due to possible private sector substitutes. Additionally, most analyses assume that survey subjects fully accept these scenarios and that all provided information receives their complete attention. Our discounted expected utility model of choice accommodates both these objective risks and the possibility of subjective scenario adjustment or selective inattention by respondents. We then counterfactually simulate willingness-to-pay in the absence of these distortions.
引用
收藏
页码:77 / 105
页数:29
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